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Can closure of live poultry markets halt the spread of H7N9?
After isolation of avian infl uenza A H7N9 virus from live 
poultry markets (LPMs), and reports that several people 
who were infected with the virus had visited such markets 
a few days before disease onset, LPMs were suspected to 
be a main source of human exposure to H7N9 in China.1 
After LPM closure was enforced in several Chinese cities, 
the incidence of H7N9 human cases rapidly reduced.2 
In The Lancet, Hongjie Yu and colleagues3 quantify the 
risk of human infections before and after LPM closure 
in the Chinese cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, 
and Huzhou. The investigators used information about 
laboratory-confi rmed cases of avian infl uenza A H7N9 
virus infection reported in the four cities by June 7, 2013, 
to fi t a statistical model to assess the daily probability 
of infection for each susceptible individual before and 
after LPM closure. They report that closure of LPMs 
reduced the mean daily number of infections by 99% 
(95% credibility interval 93–100%) in Shanghai, 99% 
(92–100%) in Hangzhou, 97% (68–100%) in Huzhou, 
and 97% (81–100%) in Nanjing.3 They conclude that 
LPM closure should be sustained in areas with high risk 
of disease spread, and implemented in any urban areas 
where avian infl uenza A H7N9 virus appears in the future.
LPMs are known to be a high-risk environment for 
pathogen transmission between birds and for zoonotic 
transfer to people. If birds spend a suffi  cient amount of 
time in LPMs to become infected and transmit the virus 
to other susceptible birds, sustained virus circulation in 
LPMs can occur.4 LPMs can then become a permanent 
source of infection for poultry fl ocks and for people 
who are in close contact with infected poultry and 
contaminated fomites. LPM closure would therefore be 
expected to stop human infections caused by a zoonotic 
pathogen transmitted within markets.
Although LPM closure seems to have had an 
important eff ect on incidence of avian infl uenza A H7N9 
virus infection in people, the underlying epidemiological 
and socioeconomic system is complex. LPM closure 
might not have been the most important cause of a 
reduction in incidence. Indeed, soon after LPM closures 
in Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Huzhou, human 
infections were also interrupted in other cities where 
this measure was not implemented.3 An example of 
the complex chain of interacting socioeconomic and 
epidemiological factors is that reports that poultry is 
a source of avian infl uenza A H7N9 virus triggered a 
drop in demand for poultry meat and consequently in 
poultry prices.5 Some producers were even forced to 
destroy their fl ocks because poultry rearing became 
cost prohibitive,6 which probably reduced the absolute 
number of poultry substantially in aff ected areas and 
reduced viral circulation, irrespective of LPM closure.
Strong consumer reactions to zoonotic health hazards 
are not uncommon. Fears of avian infl uenza A H5N1 
virus led to reduced consumption of poultry products 
in Asia in early 2004.7 However, these reductions were 
temporary: consumers’ anxiety decreased rapidly after 
the fi rst wave of the outbreak.8 Consumption of poultry 
products resumed within a few months, sometimes 
exceeding levels recorded before the outbreak,7 even 
though the virus had become endemic and human cases 
were reported regularly.
Reduced consumer demand could have increased the 
compliance of poultry production stakeholders with 
LPM closures in China, because informal alternative ways 
to sell poultry were unavailable. Avian infl uenza A H7N9 
virus is probably still circulating in Chinese poultry fl ocks, 
as suggested by new human cases reported in August, 
2013.9 If poultry consumption resumes, the seasonal 
increase in poultry production and trading activities that 
usually occurs in the months preceding Chinese New 
Year could amplify virus circulation, resulting in a surge 
in human cases. If this increase occurs and consumer 
reactions are not as strong as during the spring of 2013, 
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the apparent eff ect of LPM closure—whether mediated 
directly through reductions in human exposure or 
indirectly through other eff ects—might not be repeated. 
Informal marketing channels could develop, providing 
an opportunity for stakeholders to minimise economic 
losses resulting from reduced market access.
Although China has the resources to prevent develop-
ment of informal trading activities, other nearby countries 
do not. In other countries where avian infl uenza A H5N1 
virus is endemic, compliance to LPM closure is low10,11 and 
smuggling of poultry is common.12,13 However, the risk 
of introduction of avian infl uenza A H7N9 virus in these 
countries—with which China shares close epidemiological 
links, as indicated by the continuing spread of H5N1 
variants in the region—is high. Live poultry trade creates 
networks of contacts between poultry and human popu-
lations, thereby aff ect ing zoonotic disease dynamics. If 
LPM closure cannot be eff ectively enforced, unintended 
changes in the structure of networks could be triggered, 
possibly increasing the potential for disease spread, 
and probably resulting in reduced ability to do targeted 
surveillance and other risk management activities. 
Therefore, before such an intervention is implemented, 
its feasibility and the likelihood of unintended adverse 
results should be carefully assessed.
Although LPM closure in specifi c circumstances can 
eff ectively interrupt human exposure to avian infl uenza 
A H7N9 virus, if applied alone this measure is unlikely 
to eliminate the zoonotic threat. Because disease 
incidence in people is low at present, the focus should 
move beyond detection of human cases and emergency 
response towards prevention at the infection source.14 A 
multisectoral approach would be needed fi rst to identify 
and then target the inter-related social, economic, 
cultural, biological, and environmental drivers underlying 
disease emergence and spread. These drivers are often 
ignored during attempts to deal with human and animal 
health risks, but the motivation behind adoption of 
some trading practices and factors aff ecting purchasing 
behaviour of consumers needs to be considered. By 
contrast with LPM closure, a multisectoral approach 
leading to restructuring rather than destabilisation 
of the LPM system would be more likely to result in a 
sustainable reduction in the risk of disease spread while 
also protecting livelihoods and food security.
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